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12.1 Introduction
In January 1941, at the dawn of the modern international human rights law system
and before the most terrible of armed conﬂicts had reached its paroxysm,
USPresident FranklinD. Roosevelt set out his succinct vision of a ‘friendly, civilised
society’. It was ‘no distant millennium’, but rather ‘a kind of world attainable in our
own time and generation’, one that was the ‘very antithesis of the so-called new order
of tyranny which the dictators seek to create with the crash of a bomb’. Roosevelt
distilled his message into an inspired slogan: the celebrated ‘four freedoms’. The ﬁrst
two, speech and belief, are drawn from the classic civil rights of the Enlightenment
and the revolutionary declarations of the eighteenth century. The third, ‘freedom
from want’, reﬂects a notion of entitlement that was nourished by socialism and the
welfare state. ‘The fourth is freedom from fear –which, translated into world terms,’
Roosevelt explained, ‘means a world-wide reduction of armaments to such a point
and in such a thorough fashion that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of
physical aggression against any neighbor– anywhere in the world.’1
An intense period of legal codiﬁcation followed the end of the Second World
War. The resort to force to settle international disputes was outlawed by the United
Nations Charter and subsequently condemned as an international crime – indeed,
‘the supreme international crime’ – by the International Military Tribunal. Under
Eleanor Roosevelt’s leadership, the four freedoms were expanded and developed
into thirty concise provisions: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Conﬁrming the paternity of this ‘common standard of achievement’, the preamble
of the Universal Declaration explicitly invokes the four freedoms, as do the
preambles of the two international covenants adopted subsequently to complete
the International Bill of Rights.
The importance of ‘freedom from fear’ manifested itself in the earliest drafts
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The initial text, prepared by the
Secretariat under John Humphrey’s direction, proposed:
1 Congressional Record, 1941, vol. 87, Pt. I.
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The Preamble shall refer to the four freedoms and to the provisions of the
Charter relating to human rights and shall enunciate the following principles:
1. that there can be no peace unless human rights and freedoms are
respected;
2. that man does not have rights only; he owes duties to the society of which
he forms part;
3. that man is a citizen both of his State and of the world;
4. that there can be no human dignity unless war and the threat of war is
abolished.2
In the course of the drafting, these ideas were never contested, although the text
itself underwent several permutations. The ﬁnal version conﬁrms the centrality of
peace and the condemnation of war. There is a reference to peace in the ﬁrst
sentence of the preamble. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights also
declares that it is ‘essential to promote the development of friendly relations
between nations’. Article 26(2) requires that education should ‘further the activities
of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace’. Finally, article 28 asserts that
‘everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and
freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized’. Asbjørn Eide wrote in
his commentary on article 28 that ‘it does not take much reﬂection to recognize that
violence and war negatively affect the enjoyment of human rights. A social and
political order in which all the rights in the Universal Declaration could be enjoyed
would be possible only if there were peace on both the international and the
national levels.’3
12.2 The Human Right to Peace
These references to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights demonstrate the
centrality of peace within the codiﬁcation of human rights principles. The
Universal Declaration might be viewed as the third pillar of two contemporary
normative developments: the prohibition on the use of force in the UN Charter and
the criminalisation of aggression in the 1945 London Charter.
The Universal Declaration does not afﬁrm a human right to peace in the sense
that it devotes a provision to the explicit recognition of the concept. In many
ways, the uncertain status of the right to peace within human rights law is similar
to that of the crime of aggression; recognised at Nuremberg as the ‘supreme
2 ECOSOC, Commission on Human Rights, Drafting Committee on an International Bill of Human Rights, 1st
Session. Draft Outline of International Bill of Rights (prepared by the Division of Human Rights), 4 June 1947,
UN Doc. E/CN.4/AC.1/3.
3 A. Eide, ‘Article 28’, in G. Alfredsson and A. Eide (eds.), Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dordrecht:
Kluwer Academic, 1999), 597–632, at 620.
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crime’, yet essentially absent in the modern-day international criminal tribunals,
with the exception of the inchoate form that it has taken in the Rome Statute’s
initial version (a subject thoroughly addressed in other chapters of this book).
Identiﬁcation of a right to peace within the catalogue of human rights norms may
take the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a starting point. Such a right is
premised on the implications of the preamble and some of the Declaration’s
provisions, and on the relationship of the Declaration with the UN Charter, to
which it is bonded. Even if there is hesitation about recognising a full-blown
‘human right to peace’, the proposition that peace is a sine qua non for the full
recognition, implementation and enforcement of human rights should be unargu-
able. Thus, measures to ensure and protect peace are inseparably linked with the
promotion of human rights. The international criminalisation of the aggression
stands as one such measure.
Several initiatives within expert bodies, regional organisations and UN agencies
have afﬁrmed a right to peace. The African Charter on Human and Peoples’Rights,
adopted in 1981, recognises the peoples’ right to peace (‘All peoples shall have the
right to national and international peace and security’). In 1996 and 1997, the
now defunct Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights
adopted resolutions that afﬁrmed ‘international peace and security as an essential
condition for the enjoyment of human rights, above all the right to life’.4 During
the 1980s and 1990s, UNESCO held a number of meetings on the subject of
solidarity rights and, speciﬁcally, the right to peace. In 1995, the General
Conference of UNESCO adopted the ‘Declaration of Principles of Tolerance’,
which states that humans ‘have the right to live in peace and to be as they are’.5
In 1998, Director General Federico Mayor convened a meeting of representatives
and experts to aid in drafting a declaration on the right to peace. While some state
representatives voiced doubts about the content of the right during the 1998
conference, they all supported the right to peace as a moral principle. However,
the resulting draft was edited to leave out any explicit reference to the right to
peace, and remained rather ambiguous. For example, the General Conference
spelled out its goal, ‘to build the defences of peace in the minds of human beings
in everyday life’, rather than recognising the right to peace.6
4 ECOSOC, Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities, 48th Session. International Peace and Security as an essential Condition for the Enjoyment of
Human Rights, above all the Right to Life, 25 November 1996, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/RES/1996/16;
ECOSOC, Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection
of Minorities, 49th Session. International Peace and Security as an essential Condition for the Enjoyment of
Human Rights, above all the Right to Life, 28 August 1997, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/RES/1997/36.
5 J. Symonides, ‘New Human Rights Dimensions, Obstacles and Challenges: Introductory Remarks’, in
J. Symonides (ed.), Human Rights: New Dimensions and Challenges (Paris: UNESCO, 1998), 1–25, at 8.
6 Director General of UNESCO, Report on the Result of the International Consultation of Governmental Experts
on the Human Right to Peace, delivered to Executive Board, 17 April 1998, UN Doc. 154 EX/40.
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Central to the recognition of the norm is the 1984 United Nations General
Assembly resolution titled ‘The Peoples’ Right to Peace’. The text proclaimed
that ‘the peoples of our planet have a sacred right to peace’, and that ‘the preserva-
tion of the right of peoples to peace and the promotion of its implementation
constitute a fundamental obligation of each state’.7 Drawing upon the language
of the General Assembly resolution, in 2002 the Commission on Human Rights
afﬁrmed ‘the solemn proclamation that the peoples of our planet have a sacred right
to peace’. The Commission stated ‘that the preservation of the right of peoples to
peace and the promotion of its implementation constitute a fundamental obligation
of each state’.8 The following year, the General Assembly adopted a resolution
titled ‘Promotion of the Right of Peoples to Peace’.9 In 2005, the Commission on
Human Rights returned to the subject with a resolution on ‘Promotion of Peace as
a Vital Requirement for the Full Enjoyment of all Human Rights by All’.10 It was
again echoed subsequently by a resolution in the General Assembly along the same
lines.11 All these resolutions referred to the 1984 Declaration.
The Human Rights Council replaced the Commission in 2006. Shortly after its
foundation, a resolution on ‘Promotion of the Right of Peoples to Peace’ was
adopted.12 Like previous efforts, it failed to obtain consensus and a recorded vote
was required. The European Union explained that it voted against the resolution,
but noted the call for a seminar which could provide ‘a more comprehensive and
open debate’ on the subject.13 No seminar was convened, however, with the
ostensible reason being a lack of budget provisions for the event.14
The following year, another resolution was adopted along similar lines.15
Explaining the negative vote of the European Union members of the Council, the
delegate from Germany said:
The European Union supports some of the principles set out in this draft resolution and
recognizes the linkage between peace and enjoyment of human rights. However, the draft
7 General Assembly, Declaration on the Right of Peoples to Peace, 12 November 1984, UN Doc. A/RES/39/11,
Annex, paras. 1–2.
8 ECOSOC, Commission on Human Rights, 58th Session. Promotion of the Right of Peoples to Peace,
25 April 2002, UN Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2002/71.
9 General Assembly, Promotion of the Right of Peoples to Peace, 27 February 2003, UN Doc. A/RES/57/216.
10 ECOSOC, Commission on Human Rights, 61st Session. Promotion of Peace as a vital Requirement for the full
Enjoyment of all Human Rights by All, 20 April 2005, UN Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2005/56.
11 General Assembly, Promotion of Peace as a Vital Requirement for the full Enjoyment of all Human Rights by
All, 16 December 2005, UN Doc. A/RES/60/163.
12 General Assembly, Human Rights Council, 8th Session. Promotion of the Right of Peoples to Peace,
18 June 2008, UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/8/9.
13 Explanation of vote by Slovenia (on behalf of EU) concerning UN Doc. A/HRC/8/L.13, 18 June 2008,
available at: www.un.org/webcast/unhrc/archive.asp?go=080618.
14 General Assembly, Human Rights Council, 11th Session. Implementation of Human Rights Council
Resolution 8/9 on the Promotion of the Right of Peoples to Peace, Note by the Secretariat, 17 March 2009,
UN Doc. A/HRC/11/38.
15 General Assembly, Human Rights Council, 11th Session. Promotion of the Right of Peoples to Peace,
17 June 2009, UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/11/4.
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resolution omits to state that the absence of peace cannot justify failure to respect human rights.
Besides, it deals almost exclusively with the relationship between states and not with the
relationship between the state and its citizens, and the state’s respect for human rights, which
is the core mandate of this council. We believe that most of the issues raised in this resolution are
better dealt with in other fora which have the competence to do so and which are already dealing
with these issues.16
The preamble of the 2009 resolution takes note of the 1984 Declaration of the
General Assembly as well as the United Nations Millennium Declaration and the
purposes and principles enshrined in the UN Charter. It also speaks of the obliga-
tion to refrain from the threat or use of force in international relations, and the
importance of friendly relations and cooperation among states, with a reference to
the 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration. The preamble of the 2009 resolution
‘recogniz[es] that peace and security, development and human rights are mutually
interlinked and reinforcing’. Echoing article 28 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, it also ‘recall[s] that everyone is entitled to a social and interna-
tional order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights can be fully realized’.
In the operative paragraphs, the 2009 resolution stresses ‘the importance of
peace for the promotion and protection of all human rights for all’. The issue of the
peoples’ right to peace is linked to ‘the deep fault line that divides human society
between the rich and the poor and the ever-increasing gap between the developed
world and the developing world’. It insists that ‘the policies of states be directed
towards the elimination of the threat of war, particularly nuclear war, the renuncia-
tion of the use or threat of use of force in international relations and the settlement
of international disputes by peaceful means on the basis of the Charter of the United
Nations’.
The expert seminar called for by the Council was held in December 2009.
Antônio Cançado Trindade, the distinguished Brazilian human rights scholar and
judge at the International Court of Justice, delivered the keynote address. Judge
Cançado Trindade noted that ‘the right of peoples to live in peace had been
acknowledged and asserted before the [Inter-American Court of Human Rights]
in a number of cases. He also referred to the case law of the European Court of
Human Rights, as well as of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’
Rights.’17
Acting upon the report of the expert meeting, in June 2010 the Human Rights
Council requested its Advisory Committee to prepare a draft declaration on the
16 Explanation of vote by Germany (on behalf of EU) concerning UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/L.11, 17 June 2009,
available at: www.un.org/webcast/unhrc/archive.asp?go=090617.
17 General Assembly, Human Rights Council, 14th Session. Report of the Ofﬁce of the High Commissioner on the
Outcome of the Expert Workshop on the Right of Peoples to Peace, 17 March 2010, UN Doc. A/HRC/14/38,
para. 37.
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right of peoples to peace.18 The resolution was adopted by thirty-one in favour with
fourteen against – theWestern European and Others group states and all the Eastern
European states except Russia – with India abstaining.
The Advisory Committee provided the Council with a progress report,19 and its
mandate was renewed the following year.20 The Committee began speaking of the
‘human right to peace’.21 It subsequently proposed that the term ‘right to peace’ be
used as it has both individual and collective dimensions.22 The Committee identi-
ﬁed several dimensions to the right to peace, including international peace and
security, disarmament, human security, resistance to oppression, peacekeeping, the
right to conscientious objection and freedom of religion and belief and private
military and security companies. Reviewing the ‘core dimension’ of international
peace and security, it noted the adoption by the Review Conference of amendments
to the Rome Statute dealing with the crime of aggression.23 It proposed the
following standard: ‘8. To strengthen international rule of law, all States should
strive to support the International Criminal Court and its work on crimes against
humanity, war crimes, the crime of genocide and the crime of aggression.’24 Under
the core dimension of human security, it proposed another standard: ‘All peoples
and individuals have the right to be protected from . . . wars of aggression . . . ’25
With respect to conscientious objection, it suggested as a standard that ‘States
have the obligation to prevent members of any military or other security institution
from taking part in wars of aggression’.26
The Advisory Committee submitted the draft declaration on the right to peace
to the Human Rights Council in 2012. The preamble includes the following
paragraph: ‘Convinced that the prohibition of the use of force is the primary
international prerequisite for the material well-being, development and progress
of countries, and for the full implementation of the human rights and fundamental
freedoms proclaimed by the United Nations.’ Article 2(9) states: ‘To strengthen
international rule of law, all States shall strive to support international justice
applicable to all States equally and to prosecute the crime of genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression.’ Article 5(2) declares:
18 General Assembly, Human Rights Council, 14th Session. Promotion of the Right of Peoples to Peace,
23 June 2010, UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/14/3, para. 15.
19 General Assembly, Human Rights Council, 17th Session. Progress Report of the Human Rights Council
Advisory Committee on the Right of Peoples to Peace, 1 April 2011, UN Doc. A/HRC/17/39.
20 General Assembly, Human Rights Council, 17th Session. Promotion of the Right of Peoples to Peace,
15 July 2011, UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/17/16. The vote was thirty-two in favour with the fourteen states
associated with the Western European and Other group and the Eastern European states with the exception
of Russia voting against.
21 General Assembly, Human Rights Council, 17th Session, supra note 19, at 6.
22 General Assembly, Human Rights Council, 20th Session. Report of the Human Rights Council Advisory
Committee on the Right of Peoples to Peace, 16 April 2012, UN Doc. A/HRC/20/31, para. 7.
23 General Assembly, Human Rights Council, 17th Session, supra note 19, at para. 23. 24 Ibid., at 6.
25 Ibid., at 9. 26 Ibid., at 12.
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‘States have the obligation to prevent members of any military or other security
institution from taking part in wars of aggression..27
The Council responded to the Advisory Committee draft declaration, convening
an ‘open-ended intergovernmental working group’ that was tasked ‘to progres-
sively negotiate a draft United Nations declaration on the right to peace’.28
The vote was recorded, with thirty-four in favour, one against, and twelve absten-
tions. It was divided almost entirely on regional lines. The United States voted
against, the European members of the Council and India abstained.
The Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working Group met in February 2013.
More than eighty member states and a large number of observers participated,
although several of the leading international human rights non-governmental
organisations were conspicuously absent.29 The division in views shown by the
earlier resolutions in the Council was reﬂected in assertions by some participants
that there was no autonomous right to peace or that it could not be framed as an
individual right.30 If nothing else, the meeting conﬁrmed the near impossibility of
reaching anything resembling a consensus on such a declaration that could
include the Western states. Nevertheless, work on the drafting of the declaration
is proceeding subject to further instructions from the plenary Human Rights
Council.
12.3 Indifference of Major Non-Governmental Organisations
Human rights organisations have been enthusiastic supporters of the international
criminal justice project. From an initial position of difﬁdence with regard to
criminal justice in general, reﬂected in a focus on the rights of accused and
convicted persons, human rights discourse has evolved in recent decades as con-
cerns with the rights of victims and the need to address impunity have taken an
increasingly prominent place. Much of the language in the deﬁnitions of interna-
tional crimes, especially crimes against humanity, is drawn from human rights
instruments. Yet many of the major international human rights non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) have shown indifference to the internationalisation of
the crime of aggression. They have declined to campaign for ratiﬁcation of the
aggression amendments adopted in the 2010 Resolution on the Crime of
Aggression at the Review Conference in Kampala. As a result, they have largely
27 General Assembly, Human Rights Council, 20th Session, supra note 22
28 General Assembly, Human Rights Council, 20th Session. Promotion of the Right to Peace, 17 July 2012, UN
Doc. A/HRC/RES/20/15, para. 1.
29 General Assembly, Human Rights Council, Open-ended Inter-Governmental Working Group on the Right to
Peace, 1st Session. Report of the Open-ended Inter-Governmental Working Group on the Draft United Nations
Declaration on the Right to Peace, 26 April 2013, UN Doc. A/HRC/WG.13/1/2, paras. 6–10.
30 Ibid., at paras. 20–26.
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neutralised the role of the inﬂuential umbrella body, the Coalition for the
International Criminal Court.
How have they explained their positions? Amnesty International has said it has
not ‘taken a stance on the deﬁnition of the crime of aggression because its
mandate – to campaign for every person to enjoy all of the human rights (civil
and political and economic, social and cultural rights) enshrined in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and other international human rights standards – does
not extend to the lawfulness of the use of force’.31 This is Amnesty International’s
interpretation of the Universal Declaration. The discussion earlier in this chapter,
however, shows the strong arguments favouring an approach to the Declaration by
which a human right to peace is at the very least a powerful leitmotif.
Human Rights Watch has taken a more pragmatic, policy-oriented view:
Human Rights Watch’s institutional mandate includes a position of strict neutrality on issues of
jus ad bellum, because we ﬁnd it the best way to focus on the conduct of war, or jus in bello, and
thereby to promote our primary goal of encouraging all parties to a conﬂict to respect interna-
tional humanitarian law. Consistent with this approach, we take no position on the substance of
a deﬁnition of the crime of aggression.
In a footnote to its explanation, Human Rights Watch added: ‘The only exceptions
that Human Rights Watch has made to this policy is to call for military intervention
where massive loss of human life, on the order of genocide, can be halted through
no other means, as was the case in Bosnia and Rwanda in the 1990s.’32
The footnote in Human Rights Watch’s statement may provide a useful clue to
understanding the reticence of the major NGOs in this area. A militaristic tendency
has inﬁltrated the human rights movement in recent years, encouraged by talk of
‘humanitarian intervention’ and the ‘responsibility to protect’. Of course, human
rights law has never been paciﬁstic, in the sense of a principled and intransigent
opposition to the use of force under all circumstances. The preamble of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights says that human rights must be protected
by the rule of law so that ‘man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last
resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression’. But there has been a growing
willingness to contemplate military interventions as the ultimate solution to serious
human rights violations.
Another inﬂuence may be the debates about the relationship between peace and
justice in the context of prosecutorial strategy at the International Criminal Court
(ICC). In situations where there is an arguable case that peace negotiations may be
jeopardised by prosecution, such as northern Uganda and even Darfur, there has
31 Amnesty International, International Criminal Court, Concerns at the Seventh Session of the Assembly of
States Parties, October 2008, Index: IOR 40/022/2008, 22.
32 Human RightsWatch, Memorandum for the Sixth Session of the Assembly of States Parties of the International
Criminal Court, November 2007.
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been political pressure on the Court to retreat from uncompromising prosecution
out of respect for the interests of promoting peace. Encouraged by human rights
NGOs, the previous Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo took the view that the quest
for peace should not condition his decisions about selection of cases. In a policy
paper issued in September 2007, he cited paragraph 3 of the preamble to the Rome
Statute (‘Recognizing that such grave crimes threaten the peace, security and
well-being of the world’), noting that ‘the ICC was created on the premise that
justice is an essential component of a stable peace’. He wrote that ‘there is
a difference between the concepts of the interests of justice and the interests of
peace and that the latter falls within the mandate of institutions other than the
Ofﬁce of the Prosecutor’. Furthermore, ‘the broader matter of international peace
and security is not the responsibility of the Prosecutor; it falls within the mandate
of other institutions’.33
Yet there is also much to be said for the view that the rationale of the ICC is to
promote peace, just as it was for the ad hoc tribunals. The latter were, after all,
created by the UN Security Council in pursuit of its mandate to promote interna-
tional peace and security, with Chapter VII of the Charter invoked in support.
According to the ﬁrst annual report of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia,
it would be wrong to assume that the Tribunal is based on the old maxim ﬁat justitia et pereat
mundus (let justice be done, even if the world were to perish). The Tribunal is, rather, based on
the maxim propounded by Hegel in 1821: ﬁat justitia ne pereat mundus (let justice be done lest
the world should perish). Indeed, the judicial process aims at averting the exacerbation and
aggravation of conﬂict and tension, thereby contributing, albeit gradually, to a lasting peace.34
These words suggest that the pursuit of peace lies at the heart of the rationale
for international justice. The idea dovetails neatly with the approach of the
International Military Tribunal, which viewed a war of aggression as the supreme
international crime; an overarching paradigm within which the other atrocity
crimes – crimes against humanity and war crimes – found their place.
In suggesting that it should conﬁne its activity to the ius in bello, Human Rights
Watch transposed to the ﬁeld of human rights law a concept that is well accepted
in the law of armed conﬂict. For a century and a half, the International Committee
for the Red Cross (ICRC) has insisted that its work of civilising the conduct of
hostilities imposes a duty of neutrality. In order to intervene effectively on the
battleﬁeld, it cannot be seen to favour one side over the other. It is the very essence
of the law of armed conﬂict that both sides be held to the same normative standards.
33 Ofﬁce of the Prosecutor, Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice, September 2007.
34 General Assembly, 49th Session, Security Council, 49th Year. First Annual Report of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 29 August 1994, UN Doc. A/49/342-S/1994/1007, Annex, para. 18.
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But why should this logic apply to human rights law, which is concerned primarily
with the protection of individuals from violations attributable to a state? This is
not a matter of choosing sides so much as one of determining that the use of force
by a state, which inexorably results in human suffering of huge proportions,
violates the human rights of the victims to the extent that such use of force is
unlawful. The problemwith the contrary view – the one proposed by Human Rights
Watch – is that it accepts rather too easily the loss of human life and the destruction
of property resulting from the use of force by an aggressor, to the extent that
this may be deemed ‘collateral damage’. The law of armed conﬂict tolerates
‘incidental’ loss of life and destruction of property as an inevitable accompaniment
of war. When the war is itself unlawful, the law of human rights should not tolerate
loss of life and the destruction of property based upon the trite proposal that it is
unconcerned about ius ad bellum.
There is no good reason why human rights principles do not extend to the
combatants themselves. There is some recognition of this in the protection of
former combatants, those who are hors de combat, by international humanitarian
law. But to the extent that the right to life of the non-combatant is entitled to
protection, at the very least as a controlling factor in assessing the proportionality
of ‘permissible’ collateral damage, a similar approach should also be taken to
those combatants who are still active on the battleﬁeld. The ICRC addressed this
issue in principle IX of its Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct
Participation in Hostilities, adopted in 2009. This is sometimes described as the
‘kill or capture’ debate. The Committee said that although combatants were not
required to take additional risks for themselves or the civilian population in order
to take an armed adversary alive, ‘it would defy basic notions of humanity to kill
an adversary or to refrain from giving him or her an opportunity to surrender where
there manifestly is no necessity for the use of lethal force’.35 In effect, then, even
in the most extreme circumstances of armed conﬂicts, the right to life of the
combatant is entitled to some protection. The Committee expressly recognised
the role of other bodies of law, and in particular international human rights law, in
the regulation of the use of force in armed conﬂict.
12.4 Ius Ad Bellum and Ius In Bello
To explain its reticence on the incorporation of the crime of aggression in the
Rome Statute of the ICC, Human Rights Watch invoked a Latin expression –
ius ad bellum, ius in bello – that is more familiar to the ﬁeld of international
35 ICRC, ‘Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International
Humanitarian Law, Adopted by the Assembly of the International Committee of the Red Cross on
26 February 2009’, International Review of the Red Cross, 90 (2008), 991–1047, at 1043–44.
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humanitarian law than to that of international human rights law. The legality of the
resort to force (ius ad bellum) is distinguished from the lawfulness of the conduct in
the conﬂict (ius in bello). Neutrality with respect to the responsibility of one or the
other parties for the outbreak of war is one of the hallmarks of the law of armed
conﬂict, for good reason. It is probably overstating things, however, to suggest that
even international humanitarian law, which is a more modern term for the law
of armed conﬂict, is purely and exclusively focused on the ius in bello. The
International Red Cross movement, which is in many respects the custodian of
the law of armed conﬂict, has repeatedly underscored the importance of peace in
the accomplishment of its work. Adopting principles to guide its work, in 1961 the
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies said the
movement,
born of a desire to bring assistance without discrimination to the wounded on the battleﬁeld,
endeavours, in its international and national capacity, to prevent and alleviate human suffering
wherever it may be found. Its purpose is to protect life and health and to ensure respect for the
human being. It promotes mutual understanding, friendship, cooperation and lasting peace
amongst all peoples.36
The great Jean Pictet wrote that the founders of the Red Cross, and in particular
Henry Dunant,
considered at the very beginning that the ultimate objective of the work they set in motion and
the Convention they inspired was none other than that of universal peace. They understood the
fact that the Red Cross, by pressing its ideal to its logical outcome, would be working for its own
abolition, that a day would come when, men having ﬁnally accepted and put into effect its
message of humanity by laying down and destroying their arms and thus making a future war
impossible, the Red Cross would no longer have any reason for being.37
In 1977, the Twenty-third International Conference of the Red Cross adopted
a mission statement that included the following: ‘the Red Cross, in respecting its
principles and in developing its manifold activities, should play an essential part in
disseminating to the population, and especially to youth, the spirit of mutual
understanding and friendship among all peoples, and thus promoting lasting
peace’. It seems that as the Red Cross movement sought greater rapprochement
with the growing area of human rights, the view that this was related to the quest for
peace was of considerable importance in the search for a common perspective.
There has been some inﬁltration of ius ad bellum into the law of armed conﬂict
itself. For example, article 1 of Protocol Additional I to the Geneva Conventions
36 ICRC, The Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (Geneva: International Committee of
the Red Cross, 1996) (emphasis added)
37 J. Pictet, ‘The Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross: Commentary’, International Review of the Red Cross,
19 (1979), 130–49.
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admits a special regime applicable to ‘armed conﬂicts which peoples are ﬁghting
against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the
exercise of their right of self-determination’. The International Court of Justice
(ICJ) has held that norms of humanitarian law relative to the prohibition of
weapons that cause unnecessary suffering or superﬂuous harm, or are indiscrimi-
nate, do not apply strictly in the case of a country placed in an extreme situation of
self-defence.38 The statement is extremely troublesome to the extent that it even
contemplates the possibility of lawful use of nuclear weapons. Even leaving the
door slightly ajar to the use of any form of prohibited weapon as an exception to
the general prohibition is fraught with terrible consequences. The conclusion of the
Court is provided here only as an example of the inevitable blurring between the
ius ad bellum and the ius in bello.
But even if, as a general principle, international humanitarian law is conﬁned
essentially to the ius in bello, why should the same be the case for human rights
law? In its early years, the United Nations stood rather aloof from the law of armed
conﬂict, out of concern that regulating war was somehow incompatible with the
Charter.39 The 1949 report of the International Law Commission states:
The Commission considered whether the laws of war should be selected as a topic for codiﬁca-
tion. It was suggested that, war having been outlawed, the regulation of its conduct had ceased to
be relevant . . . The majority of the Commission declared itself opposed to the study of the
problem at the present stage. It was considered that if the Commission, at the very beginning of
its work, were to undertake this study, public opinion might interpret its action as showing lack
of conﬁdence in the efﬁciency of the means at the disposal of the United Nations for maintaining
peace.40
Views evolved, however, and in 1968 the International Conference on Human
Rights, held in Tehran, afﬁrmed that basic humanitarian principles must apply even
in times of armed conﬂict. Since the Tehran Conference, there has been a concerted
effort to reconcile humanitarian law and human rights law, as if they are parts of the
same system and can be joined together seamlessly. The most signiﬁcant attempt
to relate the two bodies of law comes from the ICJ.With respect to the protection of
the individual from arbitrary deprivation of the right to life set out in article 6(1)
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the ICJ has said that in
armed conﬂict this human rights norm is to be assessed in the light of the lex
specialis, which is the law of armed conﬂict:
The Court observes that the protection of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights
does not cease in times of war, except by operation of Article 4 of the Covenant whereby certain
38 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports (1996), 226, para. 97.
39 See, for example, ILC, ‘Summary Record of the 6th Meeting’, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SR.6 (1949), paras. 45–67.
40 ILC, ‘Report to the General Assembly on the Work of its First Session, 12 April–9 June 1949’, UN Doc.
A/CN.4/13 (1949), para. 18.
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provisions may be derogated from in a time of national emergency. Respect for the right to life is
not, however, such a provision. In principle, the right not arbitrarily to be deprived of one’s life
applies also in hostilities. The test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life, however, then falls
to be determined by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in armed conﬂict
which is designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities. Thus, whether a particular loss of life,
through the use of a certain weapon in warfare, is to be considered an arbitrary deprivation of life
contrary to Article 6 of the Covenant, can only be decided by reference to the law applicable in
armed conﬂict and not deduced from the terms of the Covenant itself.41
The ICJ developed its thinking on the subject of the relationship between
international human rights law and international humanitarian law somewhat
further in the Advisory Opinion on the separation wall in occupied Palestine:
More generally, the Court considers that the protection offered by human rights conventions
does not cease in case of armed conﬂict, save through the effect of provisions for derogation of
the kind to be found in Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
As regards the relationship between international humanitarian law and human rights law, there
are thus three possible situations: some rights may be exclusively matters of international
humanitarian law; others may be exclusively matters of human rights law; yet others may be
matters of both these branches of international law. In order to answer the question put to it, the
Court will have to take into consideration both these branches of international law, namely
human rights law and, as lex specialis, international humanitarian law.42
According to Professor Hampson, the above citation makes it ‘clear that lex
specialis is not being used to displace [human rights law]. It is rather an indication
that human rights bodies should interpret a human rights norm in the light of [the
law of armed conﬂict/international humanitarian law].’43 In the ﬁnal analysis,
however, the ICJ’s formulation about the coexistence of humanitarian law and
human rights law sounds a bit facile. The same observation about coexistence can
be said of many bodies of law, both international and domestic, that may apply
alongside the law of armed conﬂict during wartime.
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has considered the problem of
‘incidental’ loss of civilian life in cases dealing with the civil war in the Russian
territory of Chechnya. It has steered clear of any attempt to address international
humanitarian law or to articulate the principles governing the relationship it may
have with human rights law. The ECtHR seems to have found an entirely adequate
legal framework within human rights law, in contrast to the lex specialis approach
41 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, supra note 38, at para. 25.
42 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion),
ICJ Reports (2004), 136, para. 106. See also Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic
Republic of the Congo v. Uganda) ICJ Reports (2005), 168, para. 216.
43 ECOSOC, Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human
Rights, 57th Session. Working Paper on the Relationship between Human Rights Law and International
Humanitarian Law by Françoise Hampson and Ibrahim Salama, 21 June 2005, UN Doc. E/CN.4/
Sub.2/2005/14, para. 57.
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taken by the ICJ.44 The methodology applied by the ECtHR in considering the
permissibility of exceptions or limitations to human rights proceeds in stages.
The ﬁrst issue addressed by the European Court is whether the limitation has
a legitimate aim or purpose. In other words, it begins by considering the legality of
the resort to lethal force rather than passing immediately to the legality of the way
in which force is employed, something that follows from a lex specialis approach.
Only if the state passes the legitimate aim or purpose threshold will the European
Court consider the proportionality of the measure in question.
Admittedly, these cases all arise in situations of non-international armed conﬂict
where the issue of aggression does not present itself, at least in the sense of inter-
state aggression. As a jurisdictional matter, the European Convention probably does
not apply to the conduct of hostilities in an international armed conﬂict. Although
the United Kingdom has been found to be in breach of the European Convention for
certain of its actions in Iraq, it has not yet been challenged with respect to loss of life
of non-combatants with respect to the illegal 2003 invasion itself. Given the current
state of the law, success in an application raising this issue would seem improbable.
But the conclusion that the ECtHR may not have jurisdiction over such issues does
not mean that fundamental human rights are not breached. The European Court case
law dealing with non-international armed conﬂict very helpfully conﬁrms the
point that from a human rights law standpoint it is essential to consider the legality
of the resort to force and not just the methods and means that are used.
If the law of armed conﬂict is the lex specialis of human rights law in wartime, at
least as far as arbitrary deprivation of life is concerned, then the position of the
‘right to peace’ within human rights law becomes uncertain. But if there is indeed
a right to peace located within the general framework of international human rights
law, as the Human Rights Council resolutions suggest, then it is impossible to
entirely reconcile this body of law with the law of armed conﬂict. To the extent that
international human rights law views aggressive war as a violation of the right to
peace, there is a point where efforts to fuse it to international humanitarian law can
never entirely succeed.
12.5 Concluding Remarks
Article 20(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states that
‘any propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law’.45 In its ﬁrst General Comment
44 For example, ECtHR, Isayeva v. Russia, Judgment, No. 57950/00, 24 February 2005; ECtHR, Isayeva,
Yusopova and Bazayeva v. Russia, Judgment, Nos. 57947/00, 57948/00 and 57949/00, 24 February 2005;
ECtHR, Akhmadov et al. v. Russia, Judgment, No. 21586/02, 14 November 2008; ECtHR, Albekov et al.
v. Russia, Judgment, No. 68216/01, 9 October 2008; ECtHR, Arzu Akhmadova et al. v. Russia, Judgment,
No. 13670/03, 8 January 2009; ECtHR, Umayeva v. Russia, Judgment, No. 1200/03, 4 December 2008.
45 M. Kearney, The Prohibition of Propaganda for War in International Law (Oxford University Press, 2007).
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on the right to life, the Human Rights Committee invoked article 20(1) in support of
a more general proposition about the right to life and armed conﬂict:
The Committee observes that war and other acts of mass violence continue to be a scourge of
humanity and take the lives of thousands of innocent human beings every year. Under the
Charter of the United Nations the threat or use of force by any state against another state, except
in exercise of the inherent right of self-defence, is already prohibited. The Committee considers
that states have the supreme duty to prevent wars, acts of genocide and other acts of mass
violence causing arbitrary loss of life. Every effort they make to avert the danger of war,
especially thermonuclear war, and to strengthen international peace and security would con-
stitute the most important condition and guarantee for the safeguarding of the right to life. In this
respect, the Committee notes, in particular, a connection between article 6 and article 20, which
states that the law shall prohibit any propaganda for war (para. 1) or incitement to violence
(para. 2) as therein described.46
The context of its adoption of the general comment seems to have been associated
with the 1984 General Assembly Declaration. It also resonates in the academic
literature of the time.47 But this paragraph on the right to life is rarely invoked
today, and possibly would not reappear were the Committee to revise its general
comment.
The uncertain place of peace within human rights law also rears its head in some
decisions of the ECtHR. In Varnava et al., which concerned persons who had
disappeared during the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, the Grand Chamber of the
European Court of Human Rights wrote:
It may be that both sides in this conﬂict prefer not to attempt to bring out to the light of day the
reprisals, extra-judicial killings and massacres that took place or to identify those amongst their
own forces and citizens who were implicated. It may be that they prefer a ‘politically-sensitive’
approach to the missing persons problem and that the CMP with its limited remit was the only
solution which could be agreed under the brokerage of the UN. That can have no bearing on the
application of the provisions of the Convention.48
The Court seemed to be saying that its job was to respond to individual petitions,
and not to concern itself with broader collective interests where peace negotiations
might be involved. In a dissenting opinion in a case involving discrimination in the
Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina (which was itself part of the Dayton Peace
46 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 6, Article 6, 16th Session (1982), UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6
(2003) 127, para. 2. See also General Comment 14, Article 6, 23rd Session (1984), UNDoc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6
(2003) 139, para. 2.
47 For support for a ‘right to peace’, see V. P. Nanda, ‘NuclearWeapons and the Right to Peace Under International
Law’, Brooklyn Journal of International Law, 9 (1983), 283–96; A. B. Sajoo, ‘Human Rights Perspectives on
the Arms Race’,McGill Law Journal, 28 (1982), 628–50; A. A. Tickhonov, ‘The Inter-Relationship Between
the Right to Life and the Right to Peace: Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass-Destruction and the
Right to Life’, in B. G. Ramcharan (ed.), The Right to Life in International Law (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff,
1985), 97–113.
48 ECtHR, Varnava and Others v. Turkey, Judgment, Nos. 16064/90, 16065/90, 16066/90, 16068/90, 16069/90,
16070/90, 16071/90, 16072/90 and 16073/90 [GC], 18 September 2009, para. 193.
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Agreement of 1995), Judge Bonello warned of the consequences of rigid applica-
tion of human rights norms when the sensitive compromises of a peace agreement
are concerned. He chided the majority for its failure to consider ‘a clear and present
danger of destabilizing the national equilibrium’, adding: ‘The Court has not found
a hazard of civil war, the avoidance of carnage or the safeguard of territorial
cohesion to have sufﬁcient social value to justify some limitation on the rights of
the two applicants . . . I cannot endorse a Court that sows ideals and harvests
massacre.’49
There is, to be sure, no suggestion that human rights law is in some sense
opposed to peace. Yet the growth in two ﬁelds that are closely related to human
rights law, namely, international humanitarian law and international criminal law,
may have helped to push the issue of peace to the periphery. The right to peace,
whether presented as a peoples’ right or an individual human right, has
a legitimate position within the overall framework, even if its role today is best
described as underdeveloped or latent. The evolving discussions on the right to
peace within the Human Rights Council reﬂect both the appropriateness of its
place on the agenda and hesitations about the importance that it should be given.
Possibly those who are sceptical about the usefulness of a right to peace would
adjust their views if they saw its potential to inﬂuence and frame the interpreta-
tion of other fundamental rights, not to mention the course of international
criminal justice.
Above all, the notion of a right to peace provides a unifying principle that assists
in bringing human rights law, international criminal law and international huma-
nitarian law closer together. Unstated or understated in human rights law, it is
nevertheless implicit. The right to peace very usefully puts other rights into
perspective. Similarly, it rounds off the corners of international humanitarian law,
so that a body of norms that sometimes looks like rules to govern killing and
destruction takes on a more anti-war dimension. The overarching theme of a right
to peace was important at the dawn of international prosecutions at Nuremberg and
Tokyo, but later it seemed to lose its way. The adoption of amendments to the Rome
Statute at the Review Conference in Kampala in June 2010 brings the crime of
aggression back to centre stage. It is very regrettable that many within the human
rights movement who have attached such importance to the International Criminal
Court fail to appreciate the signiﬁcance of the aggression amendments. Those
who cherish the legal development resulting from the Review Conference may
be comforted to know that the resistance faced in some quarters ﬁnds an echo in
what amounts to a cognate debate underway within human rights law.
49 ECtHR, Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Bonello, Nos. 27996/06 and
34836/06 [GC], 22 December 2009, 56.
366 Theory
C:/ITOOLS/WMS/CUP-NEW/8094163/WORKINGFOLDER/KREBB/9781107165922C12.3D 367 [351–372] 16.6.2016 11:41AM
This chapter began by citing Franklin Roosevelt’s four freedoms speech. It so
eloquently links fundamental rights and the prohibition of war. That clarity of
vision may, to some extent, have become muddled over time. Possibly the horror of
the war focused minds on the relationship between human rights and aggressive
war. The ﬁrst contentious case before the International Court of Justice dealt with
issues resulting from the end of the Second World War and the dawn of the Cold
War in a dispute between Albania and the United Kingdom that involved both
ius ad bellum and ius in bello. The ICJ ruled against both parties: Albania had
unlawfully placed mines in its territorial sea and the United Kingdom had unlaw-
fully swept them. One of the judges in the case, the distinguished Chilean jurist
Alejandro Álvarez, wrote:
The cataclysm through which we have just passed opens a new era in the history of civilization;
it is of greater importance than all those that preceded it: more important than that of the
Renaissance, than that of the French Revolution of 1789 or than that which followed the First
WorldWar; that is due to the profound changes which have taken place in every sphere of human
activity, and above all in international affairs and in international law.50
Two central and closely related features of this new era in international law are
the protection of human rights and the condemnation of aggression. Nothing has
changed.
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